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JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT: 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2-2-(3)(j), 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the 1980 Amended Ground Lease or law required written notice of 
default as a condition precedent to suit for breach of an express provision of the Lease or 
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: De novo review for correctness. Kimball v. Campbell 
699 P. 2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). 
2. Whether these Middletons are jointly liable for the acts of Anthony Middleton 
when Medical Leasing knew that Anthony did not have authority to act for these 
Middletons. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: De novo review for correctness. Kimball v. Campbell 
supra. 
3. Whether a threat of litigation by one tenant-in-common constitutes a breach 
of the lease, or whether all tenants-in-common must join as plaintiffs in any legal action 
against their tenant. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: De novo review for correctness. Kimball v. Campbell 
supra. 
4. Whether the common-law rule, that tenants-in-common made separate leases with 
their common tenant, applies, or whether under the Amended Lease or by operation of law 
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Middletons agreed to be jointly and severally liable for the torts or breach of contract of 
another tenant-in-common. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: De novo review for correctness; interpretation of 
contract is question of law and trial court's interpretation of a contract as a matter of law 
is accorded no particular weight. Kimball v. Campbell, supra. Determination of whether 
writing is ambiguous is question of law. Correction-of-error standard accords no deference 
to trial court. D'Aston v. D'Aston. 808 P.2d 111, 114 (Utah App. 1990). 
5. Whether Anthony Middleton's action constitute a breach of the express provisions 
of Paragraph 8 of the Amended Lease. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: De novo review for correctness. Kimball v. Campbett, 
supra. 
6. Whether there was a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by 
Anthony Middleton, a tenant-in-common, and, if so, whether such breach, based on acts 
which are unauthorized and not ratified, results in joint liability for all tenants-in-common. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: De novo review for correctness. Kimball v. Campbell 
supra. 
7. Are all Middletons jointly liable for breach of contract and/or breach of covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, when Medical Leasing neither pleaded joint liability nor 
alleged facts to support a claim of joint liability, and where Medical Leasing did not move 
to amend its pleadings to assert joint liability? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: De novo review by Supreme Court for correctness. 
Trial court's conclusions of law are not given special deference. Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 
1174 (Utah 1989). 
mb wgp mid brief 2/8/93 #14 2 
8. Whether the trial court erred in awarding Medical Leasing attorneys' fees where 
(a) the verdict did not specify a finding of a breach of the express terms of the Lease, (b) 
there was no breach of the express terms of the Lease, and (c) Medical Leasing did not give 
Middletons notice as required by the Lease. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: De novo review as a question of law. Cottonwood Mall 
v. Sine. 830 P. 2d 266 (Utah 1992). 
9. Whether Middletons are entitled to attorneys' fees for proceedings in the trial 
court and on this appeal, or whether on remand the trial court should determine if 
Middletons are entitled to attorneys' fees. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: De novo review as a question of law. Cottonwood Mall 
v. Sine, supra. 
ADOPTION OF ISSUES AND ARGUMENT IN BRIEF OF OTHER APPELLANTS: 
These Appellants adopt the following issues and points in Argument from the Brief 
of Anthony W. Middleton, et al.: 
Issues: 
I. Whether admission of MLL's evidence regarding the Zions litigation was prejudicial 
error. 
VI. Whether MLL failed to present substantial evidence to establish that threats of 
litigation by Anthony W. Middleton, Jr. caused damaged to MLL. 
VII. Whether, as a matter of law, a threat of litigation not followed by suit and 
adjudication favorable to MLL is legally sufficient to satisfy the "improper means" 
element of MLL's tortious interference claims. 
VIII. Whether the trial court erred in failing to rule as a matter of law that Middletons, as 
landlords to MLL and owners of the real property in question, were privileged to 
interfere in negotiations for sublease of the property. 
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IX. Whether the jury instructions erroneously stated the applicable law respecting 
damages, thereby permitting a double recovery and relieving MLL of its duty to 
mitigate. 
ARGUMENT: 
POINT I: ADMISSION OF MLL'S EVIDENCE REGARDING THE ZIONS 
LAWSUIT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
POINT VI: MLL'S CLAIMED DAMAGES WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
POINT VII: AS A MATTER OF LAW, MLL FAILED TO SATISFY THE IMPROPER 
PURPOSE AND IMPROPER MEANS ELEMENTS OF ITS TORTIOUS 
INTERFERENCE CLAIM. 
POINT VIII: MIDDLETONS, AS OWNERS OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY 
AND LANDLORDS TO MLL WERE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED TO 
INTERFERE IN SUBLEASE NEGOTIATIONS. 
POINT IX: THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ERRONEOUSLY PERMITTED A DOUBLE 
RECOVERY AND THE JUDGMENT IMPROPERLY RELIEVED MLL 
OF ITS DUTY TO MITIGATE DAMAGES. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES ORDINANCES, RULES AND 
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE: 
Section 68-3-1, Utah Code Ann. which reads: 
The common law of England so far as it is not repugnant to, or in conflict 
with, the constitution or laws of the United States, or the constitution or laws of this 
state, and so far only as it is consistent with and adapted to the natural and physical 
conditions of this state and the necessities of the people hereof, is hereby adopted, 
and shall be the rule of decision in all courts of this state. 
This statute and its application are discussed in Point IV of the Argument. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Medical Leasing, Ltd. ("MLL"), as Tenant, leased ground from the Middletons, 
owners as tenants-in-common. MLL was negotiating with Roger Boyer ("Boyer"), president 
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of The Boyer Company ("Boyer Co."), for the sublease and development of the property. 
When those negotiations failed, MLL sued the Middletons based solely on acts of Anthony 
Middleton, for (as pertinent to this appeal) (a) the tort of intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations, (b) breach of the lease and (c) breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT, 
The jury found in special interrogatories: (a) Anthony and his wife, Carol 
Middleton,1 (i) intentionally interfered with MLL's prospective economic relationship with 
Boyer Co. (R. at 1569) and (ii) breached the express terms of the lease "and/or" the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing (R. at 1572), and that (b) the other Middletons did 
not interfere (R. at 1569-70) or breach the lease (R. at 1572-73), implicitly finding MLL had 
been told and knew Anthony was not authorized to act for the others, and (c) MLL should 
recover general damages of $2,582,780 from Anthony and Carol Middleton (R. at 1574) and 
punitive damages of $75,000 from Anthony Middleton (R. at 1584). 
After the jury's verdict, the trial court ruled that, the jury verdict notwithstanding, all 
Middletons were jointly and severally liable for the breach of lease by Anthony and Carol 
Middleton (R. at 2962) solely because they signed the Lease as "Landlord." After denying 
Middletons' motions for JNOV and new trial, the Court entered judgment against all 
Middletons for $2,582,780 plus interest, attorney's fees of $275,000, costs, and for $75,000 
in punitive damages against Anthony Middleton. R. at 2964. 
1
 Carol Middleton's liability could be based only on a finding that her husband, Anthony Middleton, was 
her agent. See Special Interrogatory No. 25, R. at 1543, and Answer to Special Verdict, 1 1, 4, R. at 1569, 
2572. 
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C. STATEMENT OF FACTS.2 
The Middletons own as tenants in common3 10 acres of raw ground at the northwest 
corner of 7th East and 39th South in Salt Lake County, Utah. Dr. R. P. Middleton and Dr. 
Anthony Middleton, (Sr.), brothers, and Delores Middleton, widow of another brother, 
originally owned the property. R. P. Middleton's one-third interest in the property was 
conveyed to his children, Dr. Richard G. Middleton (R. at 4972), Dr. Mary Middleton Dahl 
and Victoria Ann Stearn, and R. G.'s wife, Jane. The one-third interest of Anthony 
Middleton, Sr. was conveyed to his sons, Dr. Anthony Middleton, Jr. (R. at 4317) and Dr. 
George Middleton, and their wives, Carol and Jean. The aged widow, Delores Middleton, 
a resident of the District of Columbia (R. at 321, K 9; 412, 5 9), has retained her one-third 
interest. 
MLL is a partnership (Amended Complaint, 1 4, R. at 320) whose general partners 
are Dr. Wallace H. Ring, Dr. John C. Adair and Dr. Harry C. Wong. R. at 3988. 
In 1975, MLL's predecessor proposed to construct a surgical center on two acres of 
the property. Because the Middletons wanted to keep the parcel intact rather than lease 
only the two acres, the entire parcel was leased for 50 years with a 30-year option to renew 
(the "Ground Lease") R. at 4999,1. 22. The rent was set at a modest level4 to cover just the 
two acres of land to be used for the surgical center. R. at 4999, 1. 19-22. The Middletons 
2
 The lengthy Statement of Facts is not necessary to raise or identify the issues asserted in this Brief. 
Indeed, the issues raised in this Brief by these Middletons are all issues of law; and only Issue VI and the 
corresponding Point VI in the Brief of Anthony Middleton, et al., adopted by these Middletons, challenges 
the sufficiency of the evidence. The detail is provided, however to assist the Court in understanding the 
case. The evidence is stated in the light most favorable to the findings of the jury in its answers to 
interrogatories in the Special Verdict, R. at 1569. See Koer v. Mavfair Markets, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1966). 
3
 Ownership as tenants in common was alleged in the amended complaint, 11 5-13, R. at 321-22, and 
admitted in Middletons' answers, R. at 391-92 and 412. See also R. at 899, 1. 16-18. 
4
 For the whole parcel, the rent was only S260 per month during construction of the surgical center, and 
$6,240 for the following year. The rent was S 15,000 for the fifth year of the Lease. Ex. P-l, 1 1.2. 
mb.wgp.mid.brief.2/8/93.# 14 6 
believed they would be able to participate in further development rentals because if MLL 
undertook to sublease the remaining property to a major independent developer, as a 
practical matter, the developer or the developer's lender would likely insist that MLL obtain 
the Middletons' agreement to subordinate5 (i.e., mortgage) the fee to the development 
lender's lien (R. P. Middleton, R. at unnumbered page following 5701) or that the lenders 
would require consent to the development or changes in the lease; then the parties would 
work together on the development and Middletons would participate therein. R. at 4998-99, 
5001-2, 5004. The Middletons subordinated to MLL's construction lender their fee interest 
in the two acres where the surgical center would be built (Ex. P-l at 9-14), but expressly did 
not subordinate the rest. Id. at 14. 
Five years later, Middletons were asked to subordinate another .75 acre. An 
Amended Ground Lease (Ex. P-3) ("Amended Lease") made in 1980 provided for the 
requested subordination.6 Ex. P-3 at 7-12. It changed the renewal period from 30 to 15 
years. 
Each Middleton signed the Amended Lease separately as "Landlord" and it refers 
throughout to "Landlord" in the singular. The Lease is silent concerning whether the parties 
intended the Middletons, as tenants-in-common, to be jointly liable for the acts of one of 
them. 
The Amended Lease specifically states the Middletons are not required to give 
further consent or subordination for development, but that such consent is "solely at 
5
 The original Ground Lease in 1975 stated: "Tenant has represented to Landlord that it will be 
impossible for it to finance the construction of the Surgical Center without the subordination of the Landlord 
of its fee title to the two acres. . . ." Ex. P-l at 10. 
0
 For the first three years of the Amended Lease, rent for the whole property was only S25,200 per year. 
MLL was responsible for utilities and taxes. 
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landlord's discretion." J 8. Therefore, if MLL asked for consent or subordination for 
development, the Middletons anticipated asking for more lease income in return. R. at 
5004. MLL had a similar view: if MLL asked Middletons for consent, Middletons would 
ask for more money. Dr. Wong, R. at 4916. 
The Amended Lease contains at paragraph 12 a "notice and right to cure provision" 
benefitting MLL and its lenders and subtenants: 
Landlord further agrees that in the event of any default by Tenant under this Ground 
lease, any mortgagee or other holder of a security interest in Tenant's leasehold or 
improvements and/or any assignee or subtenant of Tenant may cure such default 
within the time allowed Tenant for same hereunder and continue this Ground Lease 
in full force and effect. 
The following additional provisions of the Amended Lease are pertinent: paragraph 6, 
regarding default; paragraph 8, regarding development of the remaining property; 
paragraphs 12 and 13 regarding notices; and paragraph 16 regarding attorneys' fees. These 
provisions are set out in the Argument. 
Three weeks after the Amended Lease was signed, MLL subleased a part of the 
property to Zions Bank. ("Zions Sublease" dated August 22, 1980, Ex. P-4). Coinciding with 
the Amended Lease's notice and right to cure clause, Zions Sublease paragraph 15 reads: 
In the event Lessor receives any notice of any default under said Amended Ground 
Lease, Lessor shall promptly, no later than three (3) days from the receipt of said 
notice by Lessor, deliver to Lessee a copy of said notice. Lessee may elect, in its sole 
discretion, to cure said default on behalf of Lessor and thereby reinstate and continue 
in effect said Amended Ground Lease. In the event Lessee remedies any such 
default [Lessor is responsible for Lessee's costs]. 
Although the Middletons were not asked to subordinate, Zions insisted that it needed 
Middletons' consent to its sublease and MLL insisted that consent be given by the 
Middletons without compensation. Ex. P-6. Zions, even over MLL's objections (R. at 4161), 
mb.wgp.mid.brief.2/8/93.# 14 8 
sued MLL and the Middletons for a declaration that consent was not necessary or, if 
necessary, that MLL must obtain it from Middletons. Zions Utah Bancorporation v. Medical 
Leasing Limited, et al. See Zions' Complaint, Ex. P-10. The Zions' complaint alleged: 
"Paragraph 8 of the Lease requires the consent of the Middletons" (if 14); "Medical Leasing 
asserts that the consent of the Middletons is not required" (1 16); "Medical Leasing refuses 
to procure the consent of Middletons" (1 20); and "it is uncertain whether the consent of 
Middletons is required ..." (1 22). In 1985, the parties reached a settlement by which MLL 
paid the Middletons $21,000 (R. at 4162,1. 5-9) and the parties agreed to a mutual release 
of all claims and a stipulation that restated paragraph 8 of the 1980 Amended Ground Lease 
to cure the "uncertainty" Zions had pleaded as to whether consent to subleases or 
development of the property was or was not required and under what conditions. Ex. P-16 
at 4-5. 
Prior to and during the Zions case, Anthony Middleton and George P. Middleton and 
their wives were represented by one law firm and the other Middletons had different 
counsel. R. at 4030, 4033; see Exs. P-8, P-ll, P-15. Different positions were taken by each 
group. Id. 
In 1987, MLL began discussing development of the remaining property (5.135 acres) 
with Boyer Co. (R. at 4050) expressly on a non-subordinated basis. Because MLL did not 
want to share any proceeds from such development with the Middletons, the Middletons 
were not told of the negotiations (Ring, R. at 4170, 4181) until 1989 (Dr. Wong, R. at 4894-
95) when Boyer insisted on it. 
In June 1988, MLL and Boyer Co. signed a letter agreement (Ex. P-22) (the 
"Development Agreement") for Boyer Co. to sublease and develop the remaining 5.135 
acres, conditioned, among other things, upon Boyer Co. getting the property zoned 
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commercial and the parties signing a sublease by December 31, 1988. In December 1988, 
the time to sign the sublease was extended to January 31, 1989. Ex. P-32. 
The Boyer Co. obtained rezoning and removed the contingencies of the Development 
Agreement (Ex. P-32), but MLL did not prepare the first draft of the proposed sublease 
until February 3, 1989, after the Development Agreement expired. Boyer Co.'s lawyer, 
Victor Taylor of Kimball, Parr, Crockett & Waddoups, on March 14, 1989 wrote (Ex. D-14) 
MLL's lawyer, John Parsons, that a number of "major business hurdles" must be resolved. 
He identified changes MLL would need to make in the Amended Lease, including: 
1) MLL must obtain Middletons' consent to the Boyer Co. sublease; and 
2) MLL and the Middletons must again amend the Amended Lease to 
provide that if MLL defaults on the Amended Lease the Middletons will "attorn" to 
Boyer Co. and will perform MLL's obligations to Boyer Co.7 under the sublease and 
Middletons would accept Boyer Co.'s performance of its obligation under the 
sublease by Boyer or by any sublessee of or lender to Boyer; and 
3) measuring the rent to MLL in part on Boyer Co.'s rentals received from 
subtenants "violates the letter and spirit" of the provision in paragraph 8 of the 
Amended Lease under which MLL might sublease without Middleton consent,8 and 
that "the Sublessee [Boyer Co.] is unwilling to take the risk of such violation, the 
result of which could be termination" of the Amended Lease; 
7
 This attornment provision would impose MLL's duties to Boyer Co. on Middletons. Under the Amended 
Lease, Middletons are not required to do so. The trial court so ruled. R. 301-2. 
8
 Taylor said "having rental payable under the sublease determined on the basis of the rental income from 
the premises violates the letter and spirit of this provision;' referring to 1 8 of the Amended Lease that an 
independent third party could develop without subordination. Ex. D-14. Taylor was referring to the text of 
the Amended Lease. He testified that his opinion did not change when he later was provided the text of 
paragraph 8 as modified by the Zions Stipulation. R. at 5439. 
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MLL objected to Boyer making requests of the Middletons foi ^i concessions, 
anticipating the Middletons would ask for more rent, P ^ \ •:-;. • pi sit it n 
was -J '-Iv.i- < j . b lawyer was wrong on the first two points; it refused to change the rent 
clause and said Boyer Co. ought to be content with the "right to cure" clause that /ions 
ci^c;-U- -ni clause demanded.9 MLL's lawyer wrote to Boyer Co. 
on April 10, 1989 that . "MLL believes the consent of the Middleton's is not only 
unnecessary h-. i request unreasonable . . ." 
R. at 4399, Ex. D-15. M; L told Boyer the Middletons were "litigious" as evidenced by the 
Zions action, whenin fact Aiiwjici- ii^  ,i ^ .*: • . : ^ m: sucu by Zlons 
and MLL. Exs. P-il and IM:. MLL insisted that Boyer * .« was -:ii.;J bv the 
Development Agreement to sign the proposed sublease as is, threatening *uit H neeessary 
R ,ii IS71), 
Boyer Co. explained to its mortgage broker, Bonne\n e .Muituage ; ..; 
nature i it' the proposed transaction and asked if financing could be arranged for the project 
using the proposed sublease. Banks, R. at 5396. Boyer Co.'s mortgage broker asked its 
legal counsel, Greg - •• •• -. . - m . • -'meii, foi an opinion as to the 
"financeability of the proposed arrangement," and 
If in your professional opinion the proposed ground lease(s) are not 
acceptable to our investors, please so advise at your earliest convenience so that we 
can so advise our client. [Ex. D-17]. 
By letter of \ M \ .-<;. ^<^ . : * * • "•:. Mile Mortgage 
( r iparly a n c j Boyer Co. that Middletons' consent and attornment, inter alia, would be 
required by a lender, that he agreed "heartily" with Taylor's Maieh 11, I'W letter, ami that 
9
 Boyer Co.'s lawyer, Mr. Taylor, testified as to the purpose and importance of the proposed provisions 
(R. at 5431-33, 5498-99, 5501-02). 
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the proposed transaction was too complex even if "very substantial changes are made in the 
leases." Ex. D-18. 
On July 25, 1989, Drs. Ring, Wong and Adair, partners in MLL, met with Boyer, his 
attorney, Vic Taylor, and Greg Gardner, his employee. R. 4116. They discussed the major 
business hurdles Taylor had raised in his March 14, 1989 letter. Parsons, R. at 4531. Dr. 
Ring interrupted and said "we are not going to the Middletons." Id. at 4532. According to 
Dr. Ring, Boyer said10 "we can work around that," (Dr. Ring, R. at 4121,1. 5-6) and that he 
wanted "to make a deal, not break a deal." R. at 4121. Although the Amended Lease 
directed that all notices be sent to Dr. Richard P. Middleton, nevertheless, Boyer told the 
group he wanted to speak to Dr. Anthony Middleton, Jr. ("Anthony"), his friend, about the 
project. R. at 4122. MLL continued to insist that the sublease be signed without contacting 
the Middletons at all. Boyer stated to MLL that he was concerned about getting into a 
"litigation box," that is, he feared he would be sued either way he went. R. at 4121. 
Finally, MLL acquiesced and agreed Boyer could talk to Anthony Middleton. R. at 
4298. Boyer approached Anthony at church in late July, 1989 (R. at 5530), told him briefly 
of his proposed development and said he wanted to meet with him to discuss it. This was 
the first time any of the Middletons knew of the negotiations between MLL and Boyer Co. 
(R. at 4895, 4981, and 5530) which had been going on for almost two years. Two weeks 
later, Anthony talked with Boyer who told him MLL wanted Boyer Co. to develop retail 
shops and offices on the property. Ex. P-37. Knowing no more, Anthony recorded in his 
diary: 
10
 Middletons objected to Dr. Ring's hearsay testimony on this subject. R. at 4119. 
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Roger's company is so strong that they can do w ithout subordination, and I 
suspect we are dead in the water the way that stupid contract is put together by 
Uncle Dick and [his lawyer]. I am going to meet with Roger this coming Tuesday 
morning to go over the plans and see if there is something that can be done about 
it, but my strong hunch is that we are sunk and will have to live with the idea that 
those birds will derive a very handsome income off the development without actually 
including the actual owners of the land at all. [Ex. P-37] 
Mt'iinwhik', Ml I , 1 )i Wnnii, who worked daily in the same hospital with D. Richard 
G. Middleton ("R.G."), was sent by MLL to tell R.G. that Boyer was going to iaik in 
Anthony. ri:-.-. *. : *• •: .ospital 1 lall ai id Di Wong said Boyer was going to develop the 
property without subordination, that Boyer was going to talk to Anthony about it and asked 
if R.G. wanted to attend * at 4895, IW" Di Wtw, testified R.G. said his 
presence at the meeting was not necessary if subordination were not requested, that Anthony 
only represents a third of the Middleton family, an^ > ••• •* l w ; i \ % 
.m-t i Vnthony's. R. at 4910. 
i Vi Vigust 7 or 8, 1989, Boyer met with Anthony. Bo\n inld \nlhrny lh.il lit1 JIIJI 
his lavw n s \s t'T t1 of* t»M' opinion that Middletons' consent to a sublease was needed. R. 5534, 
1. 5-9; R. 5601,1.19-20. Boyer also told Anthony that MLL had threatened to sue Bom i i» 
if it d;^  > - 5^b>, 5540. But Boyer did not tell Anthony the 
specifics of why his lawyer said Middletons' consent was necessary, nor of the concessions 
necessary to make the SUPUMM1 \nthony said he was glad Boyer was 
developing the property. 
On September 26, IW/ -n . KOU\\ Greg Gardner, Dr. 
Ring and Anthony. Dr. Ring testified: 
THE WITNESS: Roger continued his addressing Tony And he had in 
is hand a document. The document was the Ground Lease, as modified by the Zions' 
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declaration or the Zions' determination. And He said " - And he read from it and 
He said: "It seems to me that this is very clear, Tony, that your consent is not 
required." 
MR. BURBIDGE: What, if anything, did Tony Middleton say in response? 
A. He said "Well, I don't think that makes any difference." He said, "If a 
stake goes in the ground, the Middletons will sue." (indicating) ["]Fm not saying I'll 
sue, but I'll guarantee you there are members of the Middleton family that will sue, 
because we have a right to participate." 
Q. All right. Now, did anyone ask Tony what the basis of this statement was? 
A. Roger did. 
Q. Did Tony respond? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did he say? 
A. He says: "As the rightful landowners, we have a right to participate on any 
development that's goes on out there on a" -- he says, "It is just a philosophical basis. 
It may not be in the contract, but, philosophically, we have that right." [R. at 4126-
27] 
Boyer said he could not go forward with the threat of litigation. [R. at 4135] 
On cross-examination, Dr. Ring testified he said "whatever [Boyer Co. feels] it needs from 
the Middletons its something they should obtain from them." R. at 4440. 
Anthony recorded in his diary regarding the September 26, 1989 meeting with Boyer, 
Greg Gardner and Dr. Ring: 
We sat down and went through the history of the contract and leases, me 
giving my side of it and Wally Ring giving his side of it, and in a rather amicable 
session I felt that everybody had agreed that there would be some compensation paid 
the Middleton family. . . . 
At any rate, we got the point made since then that the only thing we are 
interested in is increasing the income realized from the property in return for which 
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the Middleton family will agree not to challenge the contract in court. The way 
things now stand is that Wally understands that we are bargaining and deliberating 
to see how much of an increase is acceptable. . . . Roger Boyer is aware of that as 
well, and I pointed out to Roger that Wally as a point of principle has stated several 
times to me that the Boyer Company is going to have to give a little something up 
to make this contract go, and I asked Roger to see if there isn't any way they can do 
that. [Ex. P-37]11 
(in (K'luk i Ill, 1(AS(I„ l)i Woiw mil 1 >i\ Ring met with Anthony at the Marriott 
Hotel. v Ring presented a possible revision to the Amended Lease, a "revised escalator." 
R. at 4 L ? > ^ . i HI kmitg (csiitiaii 
A. Tony said . . ."I've got to have some kind of a bone to throw to the family. 
I can't just walk away from this. Tell me that you are willing to pay something." He 
said: "I know I can do it for $25,000." 
yylcj j saj<j? »j ( j o n L li i i i i iv ^ Could talk my people into $10,000." 
"There is nothing in here that gives you any immediate money, and the 
only escalator that you will get to your monthly, or your annual income, would be that 
increase that you would get as the rents go up." 
And he said, "Well, you realize that if we don't get this, we are going lo sue?" 
And I became a little hot under the collar. 
Q Just tell me what you said. 
A. And I told him there was no way that we were going u» go aluiui w iih lli.n 
kind of extortion. 
That's when he came up with "Well, I've got to have some kind of a bone to 
throw to the family or I know there's going to be a lawsuit." [R. at 4141-42]12 
r first Tuesday in November 1989, at IIK 1 ort 
Douglas Club ; >r. Ring told Anthony that MLL had decided that it would not pay anything 
11
 Dr. Ring testified further and other witnesses testified about the September 26, 1989 meeting: Ring, 
R. at 4432-46; the testimony in the text is consistent with the other witnesses' testimony or is more favorable 
to MI L than the other witnesses' testimony. 
12
 Other witnesses testified about the October 10, 1989 meeting: Anthony Middleton, Jr.: R. at 4367-70; 
the testimony in the text is consistent with the other witnesses' testimony or is more favorable to MLL than 
the other witnesses' testimony. 
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to the Middletons. R. at 4142-43. Dr. Ring testified that Anthony said "If we don't get some 
money, we are going to sue." R. at 4144. 
On November 11,1989, Boyer held a meeting at his house. The meeting was secretly 
recorded by Dr. Ring. Ex. D-27. Boyer proposed a deal where both MLL and the 
Middletons would participate as equity owners in development of the property. Id. at 3. 
Boyer was making the proposal because he wanted to develop the property, but it was at 
a stalemate. Id. at 1, 17. Anthony expressed his enthusiasm for exploring Boyer's proposal. 
Id. at 12. Boyer said he did not think he was bound by the development agreement and that 
he would have to obtain financing to develop the property. Id. at 18. Dr. Ring responded: 
MR. RING: I think what my position was at that meeting is that we felt that 
what Roger was asking for here was nothing that would increase the risk of the 
Middletons. It was something that should be drafted because it was nothing but a 
favor. If you will, as any responsible landlord would recognize the responsibilities 
to do so, and what you're saying is give us the right to cure, give us some piece of 
presence so that we won't be sued, and I think that we did not come away from there 
with the feeling that that was available. As a matter of fact, as you said right off the 
bat, you said it then and you've said it at every meeting we've had, is that if any 
development happens out there, you're going to sue. 
MR. ANTHONY MIDDLETON: No, that's only half of what I said. There 
would be - very likely be a suit entered if zero participation on the part of the 
owners. [Ex. D-27 at 18.] 
Boyer was attempting to find a solution: 
MR. RING: . . . If you remember, the last time there was, I believe, on the 
part of you, Roger, and you, Tony, we were talking about taking what would be 
received from Roger and dividing it. That isn't what I had in mind. 
So when I left there I thought what you were asking for was the future 
increase on the land, not what -
MR. BOYER: I thought that's what both of you said. That's the implication. 
He said we would litigate if they don't participate, and you suggested that I think we 
have a binding agreement. 
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MR. RING: I think we do. 
MR. BOYER: What my point is, if we don't proceed I think the in lplication 
is that we litigate. If we did proceed, the implication is we litigate. 
MR. RING: There is a third opportunity. There is an opportunity to litigate, 
and that's simply to go to court and get clarification of what might be required of the 
landowner without any further approval, and rather than take the passive approach 
(inaudible), we can take the active approach and find out what it's all about. 
This is what happened last time. We got it clarified (inaudible). That isn't 
litigation in the sense that we would be trying to force your contract, it would be a 
litigation attempt to try to clarify so that we can proceed without it being litigated. 
MR. ANTHONY MIDDLETON: Basically, the reason we're all meeting here 
is to avoid litigation in the first place. I'd like to hear what your proposal is, Roger. 
I don't think I can understand what you're talking about without a scenario, and I 
suspect you fellows wouldn't understand without running it past your attorneys. [Ex. 
D-27 at 32, 33] 
At those meetings Anthony stated he was in favor of Bow 
i- it; iliai me Middletons would nc: sue, saui ik believed tne 
Middletons would agree not to contest the contract in court if more rent were pan! | K 
44l)2-(>3 | He alMi said \w helievvd tint if the development went forward without additional 
rent, that it was likely some member of the family in this or future generations would sue. 
R. at 4463, 44f>4 He Mini lie leit phiinsophicallv th.it in Middlrtons were entitled to share 
in rent from any future development, R, at 4440, 4446-47. 
At these meetings held among Anthony, Mown .ind Ml I u4piesentatives, never did 
Anthony say to MLL or to Boyer that he spoke for the rest of the Middletons; MLL knew 
he did not and never made any inquiry of these Middletons as h» then \)\ isitii mi or Anthony's 
an" • ...g, R. at 4460-61. 
On November 17, 1989, MLL wrote (Ex. P-39) to Anthony d i . c
 i; 
threatening suit, : nreateninu suit it the Middletons did not amend the Amended Lease 
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to provide an attornment clause13, give further consent to the Boyer Co. sublease, and give 
other concessions, as set forth in an attached "Second Amendment to Ground Lease," which 
quoted virtually verbatim the provisions requested by Boyer's lawyer in his March 14, 1989 
letter. When Anthony's lawyer asked for a copy of the proposed sublease and Development 
Agreement to consider approving the sublease (Ex. D-31), MLL by letter of December 8, 
1989 (Ex. P-42) refused to provide it unless the Middletons first agreed not to ask for more 
rent and not to sue, and said that even if the Middletons so agreed, "the rental provisions 
[in the sublease] will be masked," these being the very provisions to which Boyer's lawyer 
objected saying they created the risk of breach of the Amended Lease. Ex. P-42. MLL kept 
Boyer's lawyer's objections secret, too. 
Simultaneously, on November 17, 1989, MLL wrote Boyer Co. threatening suit if it 
did not sign the proposed sublease in 10 days and stating that Anthony's "threats of 
litigation" were unfounded. Ex. P-40. Boyer Co. twice declined to sign, first writing on 
November 22, 1989 that "The Boyer Company does not view the threats made by Tony 
Middleton as 'without basis in law or fact...'" and that the Boyer Co. was not bound to sign 
the sublease. Ex. D-30 Boyer Co.'s lawyer then wrote on February 5, 1990 again that 
Boyer Co. was not bound to sign the sublease because the Development Agreement had 
expired a year before and that Boyer Co. was terminating negotiations because "Medical 
Leasing has been unable to obtain the necessary cooperation of the landowner to make the 
ground lease financeable." Ex. D-39. 
13
 That is, that the Middletons would perform MLL's obligations to Boyer under the sublease if MLL 
defaulted on the Amended Ground Lease. 
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Throughout all this, the only attempt of MLL to communicate with the other 
Middletons was by MLL's counsel, John Parsons, rv ,ciu ,, ^ x N^ • 1 - i -
41), snii W rnm'.ir m ul lo Dr. Richard P. Middleton, which merely transmitted a copy of 
Mr. Parson's previous November 17, 1989 letter i Lx. l'-/>, u; Anthony and asked thai it I t 
sail I',i ,ill Mitlillrlimj 
At a meeting on February 1 \ ; W MI J '> Dr Ring continued to ask Boyt i 
would not !\ . i; % ..ions had accepted instead oi the 
attornment clause and other provisions Boyer's lawyer wanted, but Boyer still did not agree 
to go forward. Lx. LK\S, p. „\ 8. 
The Amended Lease specifically provides that a party is not in default until 30 days 
after written notice specifying how a party has failed lo peilmni and those particulars remain 
. , , ( riod (Ex. P-3, f 8, p. 6-7). It requires notice to the landlord be given by 
certified mail addressed to the person to whom rent is payable, wih,; s 
Mitidlcloii, h\ P-o "l I '" | il) No such notice was given to Anthony, iu Richard P. 
Middleton, noi to counsel for these Middletons, Moyle & Draper, with whom, pi ioi 
negotiations :;J. n \ * •••• ei mention any complaint about 
Anthony to R <}, = k. at 4909), even through they continued to work daily in the same 
hospital, D ong often attending as anesthesiology! in \i (i surgeries. R. at 4908. 
Neither the Middletons :ior Hiu: Co. acceded to MLL's November 17. 1°S9 
demands. On February 16 1C)(:: . . , Ihis aciion R, A\ 1 Mir original Complaint 
had five claims. Count 1 prayed for a declaratory judgment and injunction requiring the 
Middletons to consent and agree to the terms demanded in \II I \ Nouantvi 1 ' i ()>,|J| "r-Mrr 
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to Anthony. Count II was a claim for breach of implied covenants of good faith and fair 
dealing in the Amended Lease. Count III was for intentional interference with MLL's 
Development Agreement with Boyer Co. Count IV was for intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations, and Count V was for attorney's fees under the Amended 
Lease. All of the claims were asserted against the other Middletons on the basis that 
Anthony's acts were as agent of the other Middletons; no claim of joint and several liability 
was made. Complaint, R. at 2-26. 
Upon defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the trial court dismissed Count I, finding the 
Middletons had no contractual obligation to consent to attornment or to the proposed Boyer 
sublease. R. 301-2. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (R. 319) which included the 
original claims except those for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The claims again 
asserted the other Middletons were liable because Anthony acted as their agent; no claim 
of joint and several liability was made, nor were any facts pleaded to support such a claim. 
Defendants moved for summary judgment. R. at 447, 584. The court granted 
summary judgment against plaintiff only on its second claim, for intentional interference with 
the Development Agreement. The court held as a matter of law that there was no contract 
between Boyer Co. and MLL which could be the subject of an interference claim. R. at 
1078. The case proceeded to trial on the remaining claims. 
At trial, Roger Boyer testified that financing was necessary if the project were to go 
forward (Boyer, R. at 4874); that the items identified by his counsel in the March 14, 1989 
letter (Ex. P-36, D-14) would be necessary to obtain financing (R. at 4876-77); that MLL's 
attorney never changed Boyer's mind about whether those items "would have to be 
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addressed . . . to get financing" (R. at 4877); and that he had no recollection of Anthony 
threatening to sue him. or Boyer Co. at the meetings where Anthony was presenl. linym, 
K 11 IS"" fliv" (in Inci. Boyer's project manager, similarly testified that financing was 
required, that at meetings with MLL, Boyer Co. and Anthony, that Gardner said in obtain 
financing Bo\ci ( a need* J llu requested financing items and an agreement from 
Middletons (R. at 4821-22), and that he die , : recall \nthony making any threats to sue 
Boyer Co. nor Boyer ever :.. :-;j"i-,. « .> to sue. K. ai 4808. Boyer 
also testified that he agreed with his attorneys' letter of November 22, 1989 (Ex. I)-30) 
(which included: "The Boyer Company does not view tin' fIm JI III.UK U I'I m\ Middleton 
us 'without basis in law or fact . . .',") and his letter of February 5, 1990 (Ex. D-39)(calling 
off negotiations for a sublease because "Unfortunately, Medical Leasing has heen unable to 
obtain nil' iuressnr\ cooperation of the landowner in order to make the ground lease 
financeable.") Boyer, R. at 4880-81. 
'luvloi U'sliHe.l that even aftei the letter of MLL's counsel of April 10, 1989 (Ex. D-
15), he (Taylor) continued in his view about the necessity for the items in his March 1I, 1989 
letter (Ex. w-. t'> and continued to iu\e concerns whetbci MI.I, was independent of Boyer 
when MLL could receive rents based on rents received by Boyer. R. at 5442-44, 5448-49. 
The evidence aaai Bover 1 o. did not proceed wnfh the |uo|tvi because MLL did not 
provide a ground lease in form suitable to Boyer was uncontradicted. While Boyer was 
concerned about litigation, including MLL's threats, there is in i v\ nlence in ilu uroiu mat 
Boyer ilid not proceed because of any threats by Anthony; indeed Roger Boyer testified he 
did not remember any threats from Anthony. R, at 4877. 
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At the conclusion of the trial, before the jury was instructed, the trial court ruled that 
neither the Amended Lease nor the law required MLL to give Middletons written notice and 
30 day cure right as a condition precedent to a claim for default under the contract. R. at 
5889-90. 
Defendants objected to various jury instructions given by the Court, including 
submission of any issue of breach of express contract or implied covenant of good faith. R. 
at 5914-15. 
The jury returned a verdict, finding: 
a. Anthony and Carol14 Middleton tortiously and intentionally interfered with 
MLL's prospective economic relations but the other defendants did not (Answer to 
Interrogatory No. 1, R. at 1569); and 
b. Anthony and Carol Middleton breached "the express terms of the Amended 
Ground Lease and/or their implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing" but the other 
defendants did not. Answer to Interrogatory No. 4, R. at 1572. 
The jury found $2,582,780 compensatory damages (R. at 1574), derived from MLL's 
CPA's calculations of the present value of all of the lease payments to be made by Boyer 
Co. to MLL under the proposed sublease for its full term through 2055 as though the Boyer 
sublease were signed and in effect. 
The jury found the other Middletons did not tortiously interfere with plaintiffs 
prospective economic relations (R. at 1569-70), and did not breach the lease or any covenant 
14
 There is no claim that Carol had any communications with Boyer Co. or MLL. She testified that 
Anthony represents her regarding the property. R. at 5034. The jury found against Carol only on the basis 
that Anthony was her agent. 
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of good faith (R. at 1572-73). Hence, the jury found MLL knew Anthony was not an agent 
for these Middletons defendants as to the Boyer di\rMi v .•:.. •• M iddctons 
did not ratify Anthony's acts. The Court's Instruction No. 25 : *id i,V jury M . . . The 
Middletons claim that Anthony Middleton was not the agent of any i 
had 1'Mi*ci 1 old ,tin I knew thai Anthony Middleton was not the agent of any member of the 
Group." R. at 1:43. \11 defendants except Anthony's wife, Cami, prevailea 
and time was suhstaiilial nidi iii a Li Siippoil ilia |iiiVs finding. See, i.e., R. ui 4910-13, 
5005. 
. MLL's application for attorneys' fees ai id costs (R at 1 752) included time spent on 
claims which were asserted in the original, dismissed complaint, and for which attorneys' fees 
are not awardable. I he application also included $25,01111 I'm cxfienscs tm Ml J, s damages 
expert. Middletons filed objections to MLL's application for fees, R. at 2305 and 2329. 
After trial, the trial court held, as a matter of law: (a) Mine w.t.s sahstandal evidence 
that paragraph x of the Amended Ground Lease was expressly breached by Anthony (R. at 
2944,1. 9-13); (b) that all Middletons were jointly liable for the breach < . . 
. a ^ :^JH)ii . leys' fees (R. at 2941-42).15 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
NOTU'i Hi"1 dofau'll piovn-aa pa i atii aph u of the Amended Lease, requires notice 
and an opportunity to cure before a party may be "deemed to be in default." u ucn notice 
is a condition precedent to die rnnmit'iNvmenl MI an .irhmi under the Lease. MLL iu};ed 
to give the required notice. 
15
 Middletons, Stipulation as to the amount of the $275,000 allowance reserved their right to contest MLL's 
claim for attorneys' fees and to contest the award of fees and/or the amount of fees for MLL's failure to 
"allocate time and fees for (1) successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) 
unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been 
successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney fees." R. at 2951. 
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TENANTS-IN-COMMON: MLL had actual knowledge that Anthony Middleton was 
not the agent for these Middletons and that any actual or apparent authority was withdrawn. 
The other Middletons (except Carol) are not liable for Anthony Middleton's acts. 
Common law rules establish: where the lessors are tenants-in-common, the lease 
operates as separate leases of each undivided interest. Consequently, the Middletons are 
not jointly liable for Anthony's acts. Tenants in common are not agents for each other. The 
jury found that Anthony Middleton was not the agent for these Middletons. The trial court 
erred in finding, as a matter of law, joint liability among all Middletons. 
If Middletons are jointly bound, Anthony's actions, independent of and unauthorized 
by these Middletons were ineffective because all tenants-in-common must join as plaintiffs 
in any legal action against their tenant. 
The rules of contract interpretation establish the Middletons did not promise the 
same performance and thus are not jointly liable. At the very least, the Amended Lease is 
ambiguous as to whether the parties intended Middletons would be jointly liable. Extrinsic 
evidence should have been submitted to the jury, as the trier of fact, to resolve the 
ambiguity. 
MLL failed to plead joint liability in its Amended Complaint. MLL did not seek to 
amend the Complaint to add a joint liability claim. Except for Carol Middleton, the jury 
found against MLL on the claim it asserted, agency. 
BREACH OF LEASE AND COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH: Paragraph 8 of the 
Amended Lease does not contain any express obligation. Middletons did not breach the 
express terms of paragraph 8 of the Amended Lease. The covenant of good faith and fair 
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dealing was not breached by Middletons. Even Anthony's actions were consistent with the 
parties' expectations. The covenaiii wl umul faith and l.ui baling does not create a joint 
obligation; only Anthony is liable for its breach. 
ATTORNEYS' FEES: I \w \vu\i court erred in awarding attorne) s' fees becai ise tl le 
Middletnns were not "a defaulting party" absent written notice and opportunity to cure, and 
because the jury did not find breach of the express covenants -M- :>; 
( ii \\ hii In lrr\ w ere ;n\"in)ed did not distinguish between the tu;t uaim, jihe4 losing claims 
and the contract claim; since fees cannot be awarded for the tort claim and losing claims, 
the entire fee .. fails. 
If the judgment is reversed, Middletons may be the prevailing party and entitled to 
fees under the Amended Lca.v • njM' should he lemanded with direction to the trial 
court to determine whether Middletons are entitled to attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MEDICAL LEASING FAILED TO GIVE MIDDLETONS THE 
NOTICE REQUIRED BY THE AMENDED GROUND LEASE AND 
BY LAW; SUCH NOTICE IS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO ANY 
SIJIT. 
A. Medical Leasing Failed to Give Middletons the Notice Required by the Amended 
Ground Lease. 
MI 1 did i lot give tl le i intici i and cure opportunity required by paragraph 6 of the 
Amended Lease (Ex. P-3). It reads: 
6. Default. A party shall be deemed to be in default upon the expiration 
of thirty (30) days from the date of written notice from the other party specifying the 
particulars in which such party has failed to perform the obligations of this lease 
unless that party, prior to expiration of said thirty (30) days, has rectified the 
particulars specified in the notice. Upon such default occurring, the non-defaulting 
party may incur any expenses necessary to perform the obligation of the other party 
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as specified in such notice, and if the defaulting party is the Landlord, Tenant may 
deduct such expenses from the rents thereafter to become due. If the defaulting 
party is the Tenant, Landlord may decree the term ended and enter the Leased 
Premises with or without process of law. The remedies in this article conferred do 
not exclude any other remedies provided in the Lease or by law. 
For Middletons to be in default, MLL was required by the contract to give 
Middletons written notice "specifying the particulars in which such party has failed to 
perform the obligations of this lease . . . " The party to whom the notice is directed will be 
"deemed to be in default" only if the alleged defects are not cured within the 30-day period. 
Paragraph 12 of the Lease provides in applicable part: 
12. Notices. Any notice provided for herein shall be given by registered or 
certified United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed, if to Landlord, to the person 
to whom the rent is then payable at the address to which the rent is then mailed, and, 
if to Tenant to Salt Lake Surgical Center, Inc., 617 East 3900 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
Paragraph 13 of the Amended Ground Lease states: 
13. Where Rent Payable. Until further notice in writing, rent shall b[e] paid 
to Richard P. Middleton, 1437 Harvard Avenue, Salt lake City, Utah. 
MLL does not claim it gave notice. R. at 2412-13. It argues that because of the last 
sentence of paragraph 6, written notice of default is required only "before the non-defaulting 
party may incur expenses necessary to perform the obligation of the other party. . . . " R. 
at 2413. That is contrary to oft-stated principles of contract interpretation. See Jones v. 
Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733 (Utah 1980) rejecting the argument that one paragraph negated 
another and holding: "It is axiomatic that a contract should be interpreted so as to 
harmonize all of its provisions." Id. at 735 (citation omitted). 
The last sentence of paragraph 6 does not affect the absolute obligation of giving 
notice and right to cure before claiming default. The last sentence deals only with "remedies 
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in this article"; remedies are mentioned only in the middle two sentences of the article, but 
remedies are not mentioned in the first sentence; ergo, the last sentence does not modify 
the first. The middle two sentences deal with two remedies of many available at law: on 
the Landlord's default, the Tenant may deduct from rent the expense of performing the 
Landlord's obligation; or, on the Tenant's default, the Landlord may decree the term ended. 
The last sentence merely provides that other remedies, in addition to those stated in the 
middle two sentences, are not excluded. The last sentence in no way negates the obligation 
in the first sentence to give notice to a party and the 30-day cure right. 
Indeed, MLL agreed with this analysis before trial when it moved to exclude evidence 
of these Middletons' attorneys' fees for lack of notice. R. at 1225. MLL said: 
[PJaragraph 16 only provides for the collection of attorneys' fees against a "defaulting 
party" and pursuant to the terms of the Amended Ground Lease a party is only in 
default if given written notice and thirty days upon which to correct any defaults. 
. . . In this case, [MLL] never received written notice of any default of thirty days 
upon which to cure any alleged default from [Middletons]. [See Affidavit of Wallace 
Ring attached hereto.] Therefore, pursuant to the terms of paragraph 6 of the 
Amended Ground lease, [MLL] cannot be 'deemed to be in default' under the terms 
of the Amended Ground lease . . . 
Middletons assume MLL's counsel was in good faith in advancing that argument in its 
memorandum16. Not only is this interpretation by MLL reasonable, it is the only 
interpretation which allows all provisions of the article to be given effect. 
Bentlev v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617, 620 (Utah 1984) held: 
When a lease provides that if a party to the lease is in default then the other 
party may terminate the lease after giving notice of the default, the notice must 
plainly indicate the nature of the default or breach and give reasonable notice that 
failure to cure the default within the time allowed may lead to termination. 
Hadlock v. Showcase Real Estate, Inc.. 680 P.2d 395, 398 (Utah 1984) held: 
16
 MLL forgot that these Middletons did give notice of default at their first opportunity, in the Second 
Cause of Action of their Counterclaim claiming fees for defense. R. at 424. 
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[U]ntil an appropriate notice and demand has been given him in accordance with 
paragraph 16A [of the uniform real estate contract], the plaintiffs, as sellers, have no 
cause of action under that instrument to terminate his interest. See First Security 
Bank of Utah v. Maxwell 659 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1983). 
MLL failed to give Middletons the proper notice and opportunity to cure. Therefore, 
Middletons were not in default under the Amended Lease, and therefore the claim for 
breach of the Lease should have been dismissed as a matter of law. 
B. Notice is Required by Law. 
Even if the Amended Lease did not require notice, notice is required by law. Section 
7.1 of the Restatement (Second) of Property provides remedies for a tenant for the 
landlord's failure to perform a valid promise contained in the lease where the tenant is 
deprived of a significant inducement to the making of the lease "if the landlord does not 
perform his promise within a reasonable period of time after being requested to do so." 
(Emphasis added.) Comment d to this section amplifies the requirement of notice: 
d. Requirement of request to landlord to perform promise and allowance of 
reasonable time to comply. The tenant may hold the landlord in default, under the 
rule of this section, for the landlord's failure to perform a promise contained in the 
lease only if the tenant has requested the landlord to perform and given him a 
reasonable time to do so. 
(Emphasis in text.) Comment d illustrates the notice requirement: landlord, having 
promised tenant that landlord will not permit use of his other property for food sales, leases 
property adjacent to tenant to another, exacting a promise that no food will be sold there. 
Notwithstanding, the second tenant sells food. Two months later, the first tenant notifies 
landlord of termination of the lease because of the competing food sales. The illustration 
indicates that the tenant's notice is not sufficient because the landlord "has not been given 
a reasonable time to force the second tenant to comply with the terms of his lease." 
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That illustration applies to the situation in this case. Had MLL given the Middletons 
proper notice claiming default under the Amended Lease, Middletons (and not just 
Anthony) would have known MLL believed the Middletons collectively should act. They 
would have had opportunity to consider what action to take, which might have included: (a) 
in terms of the illustration to comment d, "to force [Anthony Middleton] to comply with the 
terms of his lease"; (b) to advise MLL and/or Boyer Co. that Middletons would not sue if 
there were no violation of the Amended Lease;17 or (c) to remind plaintiff and/or Boyer that 
Anthony had no legal basis to act without the involvement of the others Middletons, though 
such reminder was legally unnecessary because MLL and Boyer were bound to know that. 
See Point II, infra. 
Instead of giving the Middletons such notice of default under the Amended Lease and 
opportunity to act, MLL, by letter of November 17, 1989 (Ex. P-39), addressed only to 
Anthony, demanded, among other things, that all the Middletons consent to the Boyer 
sublease and sign amendments to the Amended Lease agreeing to attornment and other 
matters. The trial court ruled, properly, that the Middletons were not required to do so. 
The irony of this case is that had the Middletons acceded to what they were not required 
to do, and for which they were sued in the first count of the first Complaint, they would have 
avoided this judgment of over three million dollars! 
The notice provision takes on greater significance when MLL claims joint liability, 
that is, that all Middletons are liable for Anthony's acts because they signed as "Landlord." 
17
 That is in essence what R.G. Middleton told Anthony when they discussed possible suit: 
A. I am sure. He asked me if I thought we should consider a lawsuit, and I was generally 
opposed to that. 
Q. And why were you opposed to it? 
A. I didn't have enough information, and I didn't think we had any basis for such a suit. [R. 
at 5009] 
MLL seeks to hold all Middletons for the acts of Anthony, without notice, even though it 
knew Anthony did not have authority to act. 
The Amended Lease's notice requirements must be met before the claim of the 
breach of covenant of good faith can be asserted. The parties' expression in the contract 
cannot be abrogated or changed by an implied covenant. Ted R. Brown & Associates v. 
Carnes, 753 P.2d 964 (Utah 1988). 
Because MLL failed to give notice of the claimed default, Middletons cannot be 
"deemed to be in default." The judgment should be reversed. 
II- MEDICAL LEASING KNEW THAT ANTHONY MIDDLETON WAS 
NOT AUTHORIZED TO ACT FOR THESE MIDDLETONS; 
ANTHONY MIDDLETON'S ACTS CANNOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO 
THESE MIDDLETONS ON ANY THEORY. 
These Middletons are not responsible for Anthony's breach of contract in connection 
with the MLL-Boyer negotiations because MLL was specifically on notice that Anthony did 
not have the authority to represent these Middletons in matters concerning Boyer's proposed 
development. In finding Anthony was not the agent of the other Middletons (except Carol), 
the jury found that MLL knew Anthony did not speak for the other Middletons. See Jury 
Instruction 25, R. at 1543; Dr. Wong, R. at 4908-4911. Even where joint liability is 
presumed, advanced notice to a third party that he or she will not be bound by the acts of 
another eliminates the third party's ability to assert joint liability. 
For example, a third person is on notice that an agent's authority is revoked "when 
the principal states such fact to the third person." Restatement of Agency (Second) § 
136(a). See, Alano Club 12, Inc. v. Hibbs, 150 Ariz. 428, 742 P.2d 47, 52 (1986): ("The 
apparent authority that might otherwise exist vanishes if the third party gains knowledge of 
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the agent's lack of authority.") Also: "Every partner is an agent of the partnership . . . unless 
. . . the person with whom he is dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has no such 
authority." U.C.A. § 48-1-6(1). 
In First National Bank & Trust Co. of Williston v. Scherr, 467 N.W.2d 427 (N.D. 
1991), a bank attempted to recover on a note executed by one of two partners, though it was 
on notice that both partners' signatures were required to bind the partnership. The court 
held: 
A partner, as an agent of the partnership, normally binds the partnership by 
executing any instrument that carries on the business of the partnership in the usual 
way. [citation omitted]. But, as with any agent, that is not so if the partner's authority 
is restricted, and if the restriction is known to the person with whom the partner 
deals, [citation omitted]. 
Id. at 429.18 The court noted: 
Many decisions by other courts have ruled that a person cannot recover from 
a second partner or the partnership for additional transactions with an acting partner 
after that person had notice of a later restriction on the acting partner's authority.19 
This principle also applies to tenants-in-common. In Wilkinsburg Real Estate & 
Trust Co. v. Lewis. 173 Pa.Super. 372, 98 A.2d 746, 748 (1953), the court held: 
Hopper knew that his co-tenant [in common] Lewis had engaged the services of the 
plaintiff to find a tenant for the joint property and that the plaintiff was making 
efforts to procure such tenant. Being aware of these facts, Hopper, if he did not wish 
plaintiff to represent him, had the duty to make that fact known to plaintiff. 
Joint liability is not an immutable, absolute implication; it can be limited, just as 
partner's or agent's authority to deal on a future situation can be limited. Whenever 
individuals enter a business relationship, whether it be as partners, principal and agent, 
18
 The court in Scherr interprets the North Dakota Uniform Partnership Act, NDCC 45-06-01 (1) and (4), 
which is identical to Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-6 (1) and (4). 
19
 The court cites eleven cases, the most recent being: Arrington v. Columbia Nitrogen Corp., 168 
Ga.App. 455, 309 S.E.2d 428 (1983); Owens v. Palos Verdes Monaco, 142 Cal.App.3d 855, 191 Cal.Rptr. 381 
(1983). 
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tenants-in-common or any other form, limits on their liability are recognized if third parties 
have notice of authority limitations. 
In this case, there was no doubt MLL knew Anthony did not represent these 
Middletons in dealing with MLL and Boyer Co. on the proposed development. Dr. Wong 
acknowledged that R.G. Middleton so told him before Boyer's first meeting with Anthony 
in August of 1989 and the jury so found. These Middletons are not jointly liable to MLL 
for Anthony's acts. 
III. IF MIDDLETONS ARE JOINTLY BOUND, A THREAT OF 
LITIGATION BY ONE TENANT-IN-COMMON CANNOT 
CONSTITUTE BREACH OF LEASE, AS ALL TENANTS-IN-
COMMON MUST JOIN AS PLAINTIFFS IN ANY LEGAL ACTION, 
If the Middletons are jointly liable as MLL claims, each would be required to join in 
any action against their tenant: 
[I]n actions . . . against lessees to recover rent, joinder of all cotenants as plaintiffs 
is usually required... . [Individual tenants in common may file separate actions for 
recovery of proportionate shares of rent if the cotenants have not bound themselves 
jointly in the lease. 
R. Powell & P. Rohan, Law of Real Property ("Powell"), 1 606[1] (1991), p. 50-34 to 36, 
footnotes omitted. 
No one would claim Anthony had unilateral power to extend the lease term or to 
lower the rent. If the Middletons were jointly bound by the Amended Lease, Anthony had 
no power to make good on any threat of suit for more rent without participation of the 
other Middletons in the suit, just as he could not alone extend the term of the lease or lower 
the rent. See Mavo v. Jones, 505 P.2d 157 (Wash. App. 1972). If the Middletons are jointly 
bound, as MLL has argued, then Anthony's separate, unauthorized, unratified threat to sue, 
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as a matter of law, cannot constitute a breach of contract because an action or suit by 
Anthony alone, without the other Middletons, could not stand as an act of ,,Landlord,, under 
the Lease. 
In Mast v. Passman, 70 P.2d 271 (Cal. 1937), a tenant in common who, as lessor, gave 
notice to the tenant of a rent increase was determined to have increased the rent only as to 
her one-half interest, since she could not bind or act for the other cotenants. 
MLL cannot have it both ways: if Middletons are jointly bound under the Amended 
Lease, MLL had no right to consider the act of one as the act of all. Thus, MLL was bound, 
as a matter of law, to consider Anthony's alleged threat as his own independent, 
unenforceable position. Had MLL given it any real credence, MLL would have given the 
rest of the Middleton family notice of Anthony's "threats" and asked if that were the position 
of all the Middletons, as MLL was bound to do from its knowledge that Anthony did not 
represent the rest of the Middletons. See Points I and II, supra. 
IV. AS TENANTS-IN-COMMON, THE LEASE BY MIDDLETONS IS 
REGARDED BY LAW AS SEPARATE LEASES OF THEIR 
SEPARATE INTERESTS; MIDDLETONS ARE NOT JOINTLY 
LIABLE FOR THE UNAUTHORIZED, UNRATIFIED ACTS OF 
ANOTHER TENANT-IN-COMMON; AS A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACT, MIDDLETONS DID NOT 
PROMISE THE SAME PERFORMANCE, OR THE AMBIGUOUS 
PROVISIONS OF THE LEASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED 
TO THE JURY. 
Tenancy-in-common is derived from the English common law, Powell, t 602[1], is 
specifically recognized by statute, § 57-1-5, Utah Code, and is the preferred form of 
ownership of real property among two or more persons. Id.; Powell, f 602[2]. 
As tenants-in-common, each Middleton owns an undivided fractional part of the 
property, none owning the whole as in joint tenancy. Each tenant-in-common could transfer 
only his or her undivided fractional part or any portion thereof, by deed or by will without 
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affecting the other tenants-in-common and each may so transfer without the others' 
permission. See, Smith and Boyer, Survey of the Law of Property, p. 63 (2nd Ed. 1971). 
A. The Common Law Rule is That As Tenants-In-Common, Each Middleton Made a 
Separate Lease with Medical Leasing. 
A lease of land by two or more tenants-in-common is not regarded as one lease by 
all of them, but as several leases by the tenants in common of their undivided separate and 
respective shares. 1 E. Washburn, The American Law of Real Property, ch XIII § 3 (1887); 
C. Tiedemann, The American Law of Real Property, § 178 (1906). A. Freeman, Cotenancy 
and Partition, § 220 (2nd. ed. 1886) states the rule: If, however, the lessors be coparceners 
or tenants in common, the lease operates as the separate demise of each, and must be so 
treated. 
Based upon this long-standing legal principle, by leasing his/her own interest, no 
Middleton promised a lease of the whole or that the others would lease their interests. 
"[T]he act of a single cotenant will bind only his fractional share." Powell, if 606[3], p. 50-37; 
Swanson v. Swanson, 250 P.2d 40 (Okla. 1951); Milkes v. Smith, 204 P.2d 419 (Cal. 1949). 
First v. Byrne, 28 N.W.2d 509 (Iowa 1947) holds: In a joint mortgage given by co-
tenants each pledges his own undivided interest. Separate liens are created upon the 
separate interests. If the interest of one is mortgaged to secure the individual debt of the 
other, a relationship of suretyship is created. Consequently, as a matter of law, the 
underlying form of ownership dictates that the promise of each of the Middletons in the 
Amended Lease was a promise of his or her separate and individual performance and not 
a promise to be surety for the others. Had the parties intended a co-surety provision, that 
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each would be liable for the others' acts, they would have said so in the document, with the 
words "jointly and severally" but those words are not to be found in the Amended Lease. 
B. The Common Law Rule Is That One Tenant-In-Common Is Not Liable For the Acts 
of Other Tenants-In-Common. 
The very idea that one cotenant is liable for the act of another cotenant is repugnant 
to the doctrine underlying tenancy in common. As stated in the leading treatise on 
cotenancy, an admission, action or representation of one cotenant 
can create no estoppel, nor furnish a basis of any claim against the other cotenants 
in common. The objection to binding one by the representations of another is, that 
this cannot be done without doing an injury to him who has not participated in the 
representations, and making him responsible for the default of one over whom he can 
exercise no control. 
A. Freeman, Cotenancy and Partition, § § 169 & 170 (2nd ed. 1886). 
Tenants-in-common may transfer their interests without consent of others, (Powell 
at 1 602[9], p. 50-13), unlike a partnership. One tenant-in-common "cannot convey away or 
alienate the interest of another cotenant unless he is clearly and properly authorized so to 
do"; Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520 (Utah 1978). Tenants-in-common by virtue of 
that relationship, cannot bind the others. Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986); 
Rocky Mountain Stud Farm Co. v. Lunt, 151 P.2d 521 (Utah 1915). That is so because new 
persons can be brought into the tenancy-in-common without consent of the others, unlike 
a partnership. Unquestionably, no tenant-in-common contemplates being liable for the 
unauthorized acts of other, unknown persons, who might later become tenants-in-common 
through deed or will of a cotenant.20 The policy of the law is not to hold a tenant-in-
common liable for the unauthorized acts of another tenant-in-common. 
20
 "Without consent of cotenants, a tenant in common may sell or encumber his interest, and thus inject 
a stranger into the cotenancy." Powell, 1 606[4], 50-38. 
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C The Common-Law Rule Should Be Retained: Tenants-In-Common Make Separate 
Leases of Their Separate Interests. 
At the end of the trial, MLL asserted Middletons were all liable based upon joint 
liability. See Points VI, infra. In post-trial briefing, MLL relied on Section 289(1) of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts: 
Where two or more parties to a contract promise the same performance to 
the same promisee, each is bound for the whole performance thereof, whether his 
duty is joint, several, or joint and several. 
MLL's position demands that common law principles regarding tenancy-in-common be 
abandoned in favor of this contract principle. 
If the common-law principle applies, only those tenants-in-common who, as lessor, 
breach their lease with the tenant will be liable; the non-acting or non-breaching tenants-in-
common will not be liable for the cotenant's breach. If MLL's claimed contract principles 
apply, the lease must be construed to determine whether the tenants-in-common made the 
same promise.21 See Part D to this Point IV, infra. 
The landlord-tenant relationship is a combination of property and contract principles, 
which has undergone gradual change over the centuries and is continuing today. Powell, 1 
221[2] at 16-11. Powell cautions: 
While the trend of current cases is towards application of contract rules,. . . 
Contract rules, however, are not always the panacea for lease problems that they may 
initially seem to be, nor are property rules always regressive in lease cases. As the 
work of reforming landlord-tenant law continues, it is useful for all interested parties 
to remember that neither property nor contract principles (nor any other rules) are 
ends in themselves, but only means to the efficient and just ordering of the landlord-
tenant relationship in a complex society. 
Id. (Emphasis added, footnote omitted.) 
21
 This analysis is independent of the analysis in Point V, to the effect that no express promise was 
breached at all by Anthony Middleton. 
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This Court has been very cautious in adopting a contract approach over a common 
law rule. In Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989), the "traditional 
rule" (that a landlord is not required to mitigate by reletting when the tenant abandons the 
premises) was rejected in favor of the "trend rule" (that a landlord is required to take steps 
to mitigate its losses). 
The common-law rule of non-liability for torts of another tenant-in-common22 should 
not be discarded in favor of the contract approach for a number of reasons. First, tenancy-
in-common is recognized and preferred as a form of ownership by two or more persons by 
statute. § 57-1-5, Utah Code Ann. The legislature has specifically recognized the 
importance of this form of property ownership. 
Second, the common law of England has been adopted so far as "it is consistent with 
and adapted to the natural and physical conditions of this state and the necessities of the 
people hereof and it "shall be the rule of decision in all courts of this state." § 68-3-1, Utah 
Code.23 
Third, the common law rule allows recourse against the breaching tenant-in-common 
without punishing the innocent, non-acting tenant-in-common. 
Fourth, the common law is appropriate to this special, unique form of ownership. 
For example, as tenants-in-common, no Middleton was able to give the same performance; 
none could convey exclusive possession of the whole property; each could only convey his 
or her undivided interest in the whole. Carr v. Peking, 765 P.2d 40 (Wash. 1988). While a 
22
 Simpson v Seavev, 8 Me 138 (1831); Marsh v. Hand, 24 NE 463 (N.Y. 1890). 
23
 Several cases have recognized the adoption of the common law in this state. See, for example, State in 
Interest of R.R. & C.R., 797 P.2d 459 (Utah App. 1990) ("the common law doctrine of emancipation is, by 
virtue of section 68-3-1, a part of the law of this jurisdiction constituting the rule of decision in Utah courts 
. . ."). 
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cotenant may lawfully lease his own interest in common property without the consent of 
another cotenant, the non-consenting cotenant is not bound by the terms of the lease and 
can demand to be let into co-possession. 
Policy considerations require that the common law rules be retained. This Court 
should reverse the trial court and hold that each Middleton, as a tenant-in-common, entered 
into a separate lease with MLL.24 The jury having found no agency between Anthony and 
all other Middletons (except Carol), only Anthony and Carol can be liable if there was a 
breach of the lease or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
D. Rejection of the Common-Law Rules Will Require Interpretation of the Lease Under 
Principles of Contract Interpretation. 
If this Court determines the common law rule (that tenants-in-common as lessors 
enter into a lease separately) should be rejected in favor of contract principles, the Amended 
Lease must be analyzed based on principles of contract interpretation to determine the 
intent of the parties or if there is any ambiguity in its terms. 
The key issue in the analysis of the Amended Lease based on principles of contract 
interpretation is whether the Middletons promised the same performance. Whether the 
same performance or separate performances are promised is to be determined by "the 
manifested intention of the parties." Section 288 of the Restatement of Contracts (Second), 
states: 
(1) Where two or more parties to a contract make a promise or promises to 
the same promisee, the manifested intention of the parties determines whether they 
promised that the same performance or separate performances shall be given. 
[Emphasis added.25] 
24
 This is so even though the Amended Lease calls for rent payments to be paid to Dr. R. P. Middleton; 
undoubtedly Middletons and MLL agreed to that arrangement for their mutual convenience. 
25
 The comment to the Restatement provision concerning "same performance" is helpful in understanding 
the concepts involved. Comment a. addresses the issue of what constitutes the same performance. 
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Section 2 of the Restatement defines or interprets "manifestation of intention" as "the 
external expression of the intention as distinguished from undisclosed intention. . . ." See, 
also, Comments to § 20 of the Restatement. 
The proper approach to contract interpretation is to consider: first, if the meaning 
of the words can be determined from the contract itself and the circumstances of the parties 
at the time the contract was entered into, Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 
P.2d 743 (Utah 1982);26 second, if an ambiguity exists, by extrinsic evidence, including 
negotiations, Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981)27; and third, the 
interpretation given by the parties through their course of dealing or conduct after the 
contract, Zeese v. Siegel's Estate, 534 P.2d 85 (Utah 1975). 
E. Words of the Amended Lease Establish that Middletons Are Not Jointly Bound, 
The court must first consider the words and lack of words of the contract in light of 
the circumstances of the parties at the time of the contract. Utah State Medical Ass'n, 
supra. 
It is clear from the Lease that the promises it contains were made severally rather 
than joint: 
Ordinarily, a promise by two or more in the singular number is prima facie several, 
while a promise in the plural is prima facie joint. 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bismark Invest. Corp., 547 P.2d 212, 214 (Utah 1976). The 
Lease uses the term "Landlord." The use of the word "Landlord" in the Lease is in the 
26
 See also: Larrabee v. Roval Dairy Products Co., 614 P.2d 160 (Utah 1980), Utah State Medical Ass'n 
v. Utah State Employees Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643 (Utah 1982) ("In interpreting the terms of the contract, 
the Court must look to the contract as a whole, to the circumstances, nature and purpose of the contract."). 
27
 See, subsection (2) of § 212 of the Restatement, fn. 3. Comment b. to § 212 for discussion of the use 
and role of extrinsic evidence. 
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singular, constituting prima facie an intention by each Middleton of a separate or several 
promise. 
No words of joint promise are found in the lease, only words of separate undertaking. 
According to the court in Lithia Lumber Company v. Lamb, 443 P.2d 647, 649 (Or. 1968): 
The theory of joint and several liability, however, applies to contracts only when the 
contracts themselves expressly or by implication, impose joint and several liability. 
Separate, rather than joint obligations arise from a tenancy-in-common relationship. 
F. The Circumstances of the Parties At the Time Show That Joint Liability Was Not 
Intended. 
The court must look to the underlying circumstances of the parties in the analysis of 
whether the obligation of promisors is joint or several. Utah State Medical Assn., supra. 
In Lithia Lumber Company v. Lamb, supra, the plaintiff joined Drew and Zelma Lamb, a 
corporation, and a partnership, as defendants. The Lambs "controlled the corporation and 
were two of the partners in the partnership, but no argument was made that these entities 
should be disregarded." There were three contracts, one of which was signed by all of the 
defendants. The plaintiff asserted that all the contracts constituted one transaction. The 
court concluded that 
since the different defendants owned different parcels of timber their liabilities, if any, 
were several. 
. . . [T]he contracting parties are liable only severally, if at all, for the 
nonperformance of any specific contractual duties which each party severally may 
have undertaken to perform. 
Id. at 649. 
The Middletons are: tenants-in-common, in a divergent family, with a trust and a 
remote widow (Delores in Washington, D.C.). These circumstances demonstrate an informal 
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association among Middletons, as opposed to partnership or some other legal entity, and the 
intent of making separate leases. 
G. If There Is Ambieuitv, Or If Extrinsic Evidence Is Required To Interpret The 
Contract The Question Of Interpretation Is To Be Determined By The Trier Of Fact 
At the very least, the Amended Lease is ambiguous as to whether the parties 
intended Middletons' promises to be joint or several, necessitating consideration of extrinsic 
evidence.27 CJ. Realty. Inc. v. Willey. 758 P.2d 923 (Utah App. 1988)('This [an ambiguity] 
requires the taking of evidence and the making of factual findings." 758 P.2d at 929). Any 
ambiguity on the joint or several liability question was resolved in these Middletons' favor 
by the jury when it found in favor of these Middletons on the breach of the express or 
implied covenants questions. The jury found Anthony and Carol breached the Lease; it did 
not find "Landlord" breached it. See Verdict, R. at 1569. 
H. Construction of Terms of the Contract by the Parties Also Establishes that 
Middletons Are Not Jointly Bound, 
If a contract is ambiguous, a court may consider the construction of the terms by the 
parties, through their actions. Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital 638 P.2d 1190 (Utah 
27
 Section 212 of the Restatement provides that: 
(2) A question of interpretation of an integrated agreement is to be determined by 
the trier of fact if it depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence. Otherwise, a question of 
interpretation of an integrated agreement is to be determined as a question of law. 
(Emphasis added.) MLL's argument at best involves a choice of reasonable inferences; that is, did the parties 
intend to follow traditional common law real property rules (tenants-in-common), or did the use of the word 
"Landlord" infer that they intended separate promises or to discard those rules. Hence the issue is a question 
of fact, and on that question of fact, the jury verdict found that these defendants did not breach the contract. 
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1981)(M[T]he course of dealing of the parties gives some indication of their intentions.") 638 
P.2d at 1195; Zeese v. Siegers Estate, 534 P.2d 85 (Utah 1975).28 
The parties' conduct demonstrates that MLL treated the various Middletons as having 
different and distinct positions and that MLL recognized the promises of the Middletons to 
be promises of their separate, distinct performance, not promises of the same performance. 
Anthony, Carol, George and Jean Middleton had counsel separate from counsel for 
the other Middletons in the Zions case and those groups took different positions before and 
during that litigation. 
It is undisputed that Dr. Wong, one of MLL's general partners, asked and R.G. 
informed him, that Anthony did not represent these Middletons, and Dr. Wong raised no 
objection thereto. The separateness of the Middletons' promises was further reflected in the 
letters describing MLL's belief that "it [was] necessary that the entire Middleton family be 
involved in any further dialogue" (Ex. 42). If the Middletons' obligations were joint, it was 
not necessary to include the other Middletons "in any further dialogue" for MLL to have 
recourse against all Middletons. 
Turner v. Gunderson. 60 Wash. App. 696, 807 P.2d 370 (1991), held an obligee could 
not escape such subsequent correspondence referring to separate promises. Here as well, 
MLL's claim that the Middletons all promised the same performance is contradicted by its 
own correspondence and performance. 
In conclusion, the contract analysis points to the conclusion that joint liability was not 
intended. If the Amended Lease was ambiguous, the finding of the jury should be sustained. 
28
 Zeese cites: Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 268, 501 P.2d 266 (1972); Bullouqh v. 
Simons, 16 Utah 2d 304, 308, 400 P.2d 20 (1965); Vernon v. Lake Motors, 26 Utah 2d 269, 275, 488 P.2d 302 
(1971); Harding Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1 Utah 2d 320 323, 266 P.2d 494 (1954). 
mb.wgp.mid.brief.2/8/93.# 14 42 
V. MIDDLETONS DID NOT BREACH PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE 
LEASE, AS IT CREATES NO EXPRESS OBLIGATION; THE 
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING WAS NOT 
BREACHED AND IS IMPOSED UPON EACH PARTY TO A 
CONTRACT BY LAW, NOT AS AN IMPLIED PROVISION OF THE 
CONTRACT. 
A. There Was No Breach Of The Express Provisions Of Paragraph 8 Of The Amended 
Lease. 
MLL claims the express terms of J 8 of the Amended Lease were breached. 
Instruction No. 23 (R. at 1540) specifically identifies paragraph 8 as the provision which the 
Middletons allegedly breached: 
[Y]ou should find for Medical Leasing on its express breach of contract claim 
if you find by a preponderance of the evidence each of the following elements: 
(1) That a Defendant breached the express terms of paragraph 8 of 
the Amended Ground Lease; 
As amended by the Zions stipulation, paragraph 8 of the Amended Lease provides: 
[Cjonsent of the Middletons to the future development of the leased premises 
is not required unless the lessee shall seek to develop the property or an independent 
third party sublessee or assignee requires that the interest of the Middletons be 
subordinated to the interest of a development lender. In other words, the lessee may 
not develop the property without the consent of the Middletons, but a third party 
sublessee or assignee totally independent of the lessee may further develop the 
property without the consent of the Middletons using its own or borrowed capital 
provided subordination of the interest of the Middletons is not required for said 
development. 
This provision means consent of Middletons is not required if an independent third-party 
developer does not ask the Middletons to subordinate; consent is required if MLL or 
subordination is asked for. No action whatever is required by Middletons under paragraph 
8, even as now restated in the Zions stipulation. 
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MLL claimed Boyer Co. was an independent third party30 developer which could 
develop the property without subordination, so no consent was required from Middletons. 
Middletons did not, by the terms of paragraph 8, promise to do anything and they did not 
promise not to do anything. They did not promise that, if approached and told by the 
independent third party that their consent was required, they would not ask for more 
rent. As a matter of law, none of the defendants breached an express provision of the 
Amended Lease. 
B. The Covenant of Good Faith Was Not Breached, 
Anthony explained on cross-examination that because Boyer told him his lawyer said 
Middleton consent was required, that he believed Middletons would be requested to give 
some concession or change the Amended Lease. He explained his understanding that if 
subordination or changes in the Agreement were necessary to accommodate future 
development, the Middletons could ask for more rent. The original language of the Lease 
expressly left consent and subordination to Middletons' discretion. Dr. Wong testified of his 
expectation, that if MLL asked for consent or changes, the Middletons would ask for more 
rent. St. Benedict's Dev. v. St. Benedicts Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991)31 indicates 
that "In [Utah], a coven .nt of good faith and fair dealing inheres in most, if not all, contract 
relationships." However, St. Benedicts's (811 P.2d at 200), explains: 
To comply with his obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a party's actions 
must be consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations 
of the other party. 
30
 Boyer's lawyer told Boyer these conditions did not exist and Boyer never changed his mind. 
31
 MLL's counsel here represented The Boyer Company there, in St. Benedicts. 
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Anthony's conduct in threatening MLL with suit for more rent under these circumstances 
was consistent with both parties' expectations that to get further consent or lease changes 
more rent had to be paid; it was MLL who breached the implied covenant of good faith, not 
only when it demanded the attornment and other changes without compensation, but in 
suing for them and in continuing suit after the court correctly ruled Middletons were not 
required to give the attornment changes. Indeed, the Zions case had addressed the identical 
issue and the parties stipulated that Middleton's consent was not required if the 
developer/sublessee were independent and no subordination was required. Similarly, Ted 
R. Brown & Associates v. Carnes Corp, 753 P.2d 964, 970 (Utah 1988) holds: 
Where a party's expectations under a contract are frustrated, he may seek recovery 
from the other party only if his injury is the direct result of a breach of an agreed 
term of the contract as modified. . . . an express agreement or covenant relating to 
a specific contract right excludes the possibility of an implied covenant of a different 
or contradictory nature. . . . a court may not make a better contract for the parties 
than they have made for themselves; furthermore, a court may not enforce asserted 
rights not supported by the contract itself. 
The parties expressed in the contract when consent is and is not needed. If it were not 
needed by the contract MLL (and Boyer, knowing the contract) had no business approaching 
Anthony on the subject, to make the specious "request for assurance of no suit," much less 
to expect or demand consent and attornment. Having been wrongly approached and told 
consent was necessary, Anthony was well within his rights to be suspicious and to threaten 
suit in accordance with his and MLL's expectancy. 
C. The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Is Imposed on "Each Party"; It Does 
Not Result In Joint Liability. 
Corbin on Contracts explains the obligation of good faith: 
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It is often said that an obligation of good faith is "implied" in every contract, 
perhaps because a leading decision on good faith from New York uses this language, 
see Kirke LaShalle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co, [198 N.E. 163, 263 N.Y. 79 (1933)]. 
While it is true that courts impose an obligation of good faith in every aspect of the 
contractual relationship; under the terminology used in this treatise, the obligation of 
good faith is "constructive" rather than "implied." That is because it is imposed by 
law, either by statute (see U.CC. § 1-203) or the common law of the state (see 
Subsec. (d) below). . . . 
3A Corbin, § 654A, 1991 Pocket Part at 81.32 
As stated in § 205 of the Restatement, the covenant is imposed upon each party.33 
"Each party" is each Middleton, separately, and MLL. The jury found that only Anthony 
breached the covenant of good faith. 
To show a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, an element of 
subjective intent on the part of the breaching person must be shown. The jury specifically 
found that no one other than Anthony and Carol were liable, so it cannot be said MLL 
proved the others formed this intent and accordingly breached the contract. The other 
Middletons cannot be held liable. 
No case has been found which holds that breach of the covenant of good faith results 
in liability to anyone other than the person who breaches the covenant. This Court has held 
that breach of an implied covenant does not support a claim under an express covenant of 
a contract, see Cluff v. Culmer, 556 P.2d 498 (Utah 1976), discussed infra, so even if the 
parties assumed joint liability under the express terms of the contract, it does not follow that 
the joint liability flows into Anthony's breach of an constructive obligation. The trial court 
32
 Corbin aptly illustrates the limitation on the notion that the obligation of good faith is "implied". 3A 
Corbin, § 654A, 1991 Pocket Part at 81. 
33
 "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and 
its enforcement." (Emphasis added). Restatement Second, Contracts, § 205. 
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should be reversed as the jury found only Anthony and Carol breached the covenant of good 
faith. 
VI. MEDICAL LEASING'S CLAIM AND THEORY OF LIABILITY 
AGAINST THESE DEFENDANTS WAS BASED SOLELY ON 
AGENCY; MEDICAL LEASING DID NOT PLEAD JOINT 
LIABILITY AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING 
JUDGMENT AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS ON THE BASIS OF 
JOINT LIABILITY. 
A. Medical Leasing^ Pleaded and Tried Theory Against All Middletons Other Than 
Anthony Middleton Was Based Solely on Agency. 
MLL's Amended Complaint asserts liability on the part of all Middletons other than 
Anthony solely on the basis of agency, including ratification. Amended Complaint 1 5, 34-
38; R. at 320-21, 329-30. The Amended Complaint contains no allegation of joint liability. 
The only theory raised and litigated by MLL was agency. See MLL's Memorandum 
in Opposition to Middleton's Motion for Summary Judgment dated April 23, 1991, (fn. 6 in 
R. at 627); "Claims of the Parties" in the jury instructions, R. at 1530-31, similarly, and the 
instruction on agency (R. at 1543). 
B. Medical Leasing Failed To Plead Joint Liability: The Trial Court Erred In Finding 
Liability Based On That Unpleaded Theory. 
The claim of ,fjoint liability" was mentioned for the first time in MLL's response to 
Middleton's motion for directed verdict after MLL had rested. R. at 5274. See also R. at 
5883, 1. 24-25, 5884, 1. 1-9. The claim was repeated on the evening prior to the last day of 
testimony when plaintiff submitted a Trial Brief containing the assertion of "joint contract 
liability" (Trial Brief, R. at 1479-82.) 
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The Trial Brief asserted that all who signed the Amended Lease as "Landlord" are 
liable as a matter of law to MLL if there is a breach of an express or implied covenant of 
the Amended Lease by any of them.34 
Rule 8(a) U.R.C.P. directs "a pleading . . . contain . . . a short and plain statement" 
to assure the complaint gives fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim. Blackham v. 
Snelgrove, 280 P.2d 453 (1955). The pleading must describe the nature of the acts 
complained of and the allegations sufficient to establish the basis of the plaintiffs theory of 
the claim. See Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982). 
Joint liability should be separately pleaded. New Jersey Office Supply, Inc. v. 
Feldman, 1990 LW 74477 (U.S.D.C. N.J. 1990); Sharkey v. Lathram, 156 N.E.2d 502 (Ohio 
1959).35 
A case cannot be determined on an unpleaded theory unless the issue has been tried 
by express or implied consent of the parties. Rule 15(b) U.R.Civ.P.; Gill v. Timm, 720 P2d 
1352,1354 (Utah 1986)(no consideration of issue neither pled nor tried); Mitchell v. Palmer, 
121 Utah 245, 251, 240 P.2d 970, 972 ("restricted to the ground set forth in the complaint 
. . . or tried by the express or implied consent of the parties. Rule 15(b) U.R.C.P."). See 
also Heitz v. Carroll. 788 P.2d 188, 191 (Idaho 1990)("the parties to an action are bound by 
34
 MLL claimed: "The duties of the Middletons are joint, and any breach of the Landlord's duty to the 
plaintiff is a breach of the joint obligation of all the Middletons who executed the Amended Ground Lease." 
Trial Brief, R. at 1480. Plaintiffs Trial Brief concludes (R. at 1481): 
The execution by all of the Middletons of the Amended Ground Lease was, in and of itself, 
a grant of agency to each of them "to act for the landlord." 
Middletons immediately and persistently objected to plaintiffs new theory. R. at 1617, 1631. 
35
 "A 'shot-gun petition* leads to careless and inexact preparation for trial, and if such is allowed, neither 
the defendants nor the court know what is the claim of the plaintiff, under such style of pleading -- does the 
claim come under the laws relating to partnership, principal and agent, master and servant, independent 
contractor, debtor and creditor, bailor and bailee, joint tort-feasors, or joint adventure?" 
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the theory on which they try it")(citation omitted); see also, M.K. Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 
612 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Idaho 1980).36 Middletons objected to the last-minute assertion of the 
claim37 and MLL never requested leave to amend its pleadings to include the claim. The 
claim was not tried by express or implied consent of Middletons. 
Had an issue of joint liability been timely raised, the Middletons would have had the 
opportunity to discover and present evidence of the parties' intentions and discussions that 
may have related to the issue, for example, with respect to the term "Landlord" in the 
Amended Lease or with respect to the importance of description of the Middletons in the 
lease as tenants-in-common. Perhaps the Middletons, their attorneys, or the representatives 
of MLL would have given testimony regarding the intention of the parties on joint liability 
in these circumstances. The failure of MLL to plead or to seek to try the issue of joint 
liability deprived the Middletons of a fair opportunity for trial of the issue. For those 
reasons, the court should not have considered the joint liability claim. 
The trial court erred in entering judgment based on the unpleaded, untried theory 
of joint liability. MLL chose the agency theory. Middletons' discovery, trial preparation, and 
trial strategy, were based on that theory. These Middletons were unavoidably prejudiced by 
the new issue on which they had no notice and inadequate time to do discovery or to 
36
 Grover involved an action being tried on a breach of contract theory. The Court granted relief on a 
rescission of contract theory. That theory, however, was not raised by either party in their pleadings or at trial. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed, finding that the trial court is limited by Rule 15(b). Id. at 1196. "The 
requirement that the unpleaded issues be tried by at least the implied consent of the parties assures that the 
parties have notice of the issues before the court and an opportunity to address those issues with evidence and 
argument." Grover, at 1196 citing Cook v. City of Price, Carbon County, Utah, 566 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1977). 
"Implied consent to the trial of an unpleaded issue is not established merely because evidence relevant to that 
issue was introduced without objection. At least it must appear that the parties understood the evidence to 
be aimed at the unpleaded issue." Grover, at 1196 citing MBI Motor Co., Inc. v. Lotus/East, Inc., 506 F.2d 
709 (6th Cir. 1974). 
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 For instance, plaintiff submitted a proposed jury instruction that directed the jury to find joint liability 
to which Middletons objected and the court rejected. 
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respond. See, Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth. 664 P.2d 435 (Utah 1983). See, Ringwood v. 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc.. 786 P.2d 1350 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 
(Utah 1990). 
The trial court erred in allowing MLL to change its theory of the case, more than two 
years after commencement of the case, and after resting at trial. 
VII. MEDICAL LEASING IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
A. Middletons Were Not Given The Required Notice of Default and Right to Cure. 
Paragraph 16 of the Amended Lease provides: 
16. Attorney's Fees. If Landlord or Tenant default hereunder or file a suit 
against the other which is in any way connected with this lease, the defaulting party 
shall pay to the prevailing party a reasonable sum for attorney's fees, which shall be 
deemed to have accrued on the commencement of such action and shall be 
enforceable whether or not such action is prosecuted to judgment. 
Whether Landlord or Tenant is in default is to be determined by paragraph 6 of the 
Amended Lease. See Point I, supra. 
Middletons were never in default under the lease because MLL failed to give 
Middletons notice of any alleged default, a prerequisite to being "deemed to be in default" 
under the Amended Lease. That analysis is applicable here: since Middletons were not 
given the required notice, they cannot be deemed to be in default under the Lease. 
B. Attorney's Fees Are Not Awardable for Breach of Implied Obligations. 
MLL has never identified any breach by defendants of the express terms of the 
Lease; there is no express breach of the Amended Lease. Plaintiffs claim can only be for 
breach of the covenant of good faith. 
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The issue of attorney's fees for breach of an implied obligation was specifically 
addressed in Cluff v. Oilmen 556 P.2d 498 (Utah 1976): 
[T]his court has numerous times said that such a provision for attorney's fees makes 
them allowable only for enforcement of the covenants in the contract. Therefore it 
does not extend to implied covenants or obligations not expressly included therein. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Because MLL's claim for attorney's fees is based on breach of a law-imposed 
covenant, there can be no recovery for contract-provided attorney's fees. 
C. The Jury Did Not Find, And Medical Leasing Did Not Request The Jury To Find, 
Middletons Expressly Breached The Lease. 
Even if MLL could identify a breach of an express term of the Amended Lease, MLL 
still cannot recover attorney's fees. The jury verdict cannot be relied upon as determining 
a breach of an express provision of the lease, because, over defendants' objection, the 
special interrogatory was given in the alternative. See Special Interrogatory No. 4: 
Did the defendants, or any of them, breach the express terms of the Amended 
Ground Lease and/or their implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed to 
Medical Leasing? 
Though the jury answered this "and/or" question "yes" as to Anthony and Carol, there was 
no determination by the jury that these Middletons breached an express term of the Lease. 
This case is exactly like McKenzie v. Kaiser-Aetna, 127 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1976). There, 
plaintiff asserted various theories of recovery including breach of a written contract and 
breach of an implied warranty. Plaintiffs action was successful, but the trial court denied 
attorney's fees, saying: 
Plaintiff has not sustained his burden of proof to establish that the portion of the jury 
verdict and judgment in plaintiffs favor against defendant was based on the written 
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contract which contains the provisions regarding attorney's fees, as opposed to having 
been based upon breach of . . . an implied warranty, or one or more of plaintiffs 
other theories not constituting an action on a contract which specifically provides for 
attorney's fees. 
Id. The decision was affirmed, with the appellant court stating: 
The net verdict and judgment were in appellant's favor, but there is no way to 
ascertain, in the absence of special jury findings, on which of the theories of recovery 
fbreach of contract . . . or breach of implied warranty) the jury mainly based its 
award to appellant. 
(Emphasis added.) Id. 
MLL has not met its burden here. MLL cannot now establish that the jury found a 
breach of an express provision of the Amended Lease. Therefore, MLL cannot recover 
attorney's fees. 
D. Medical Leasing's Claim is Defective For Failing To Set Out The Time And Fees 
Expended For Unsuccessful Claims And Claims For Which There Is No Entitlement 
To Attorney's Fees, 
Of the substantive claims of Counts I through IV of MLL's original complaint, only 
Count II contained a contractual claim under the Amended Lease, the other claims being 
claims in tort or for injunctive relief, for which attorney's fees are not allowable under the 
terms of the attorney's fee provision of the Amended Lease. 
In Cottonwood Mall v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266 (Utah 1992), this Court reversed an award 
of attorney's fees, stating: 
One who seeks an award of attorney's fees must set out the time and fees 
expended for (1) successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to 
attorney's fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an 
entitlement to attorney's fees had the claims been successful, and (3) claims for which 
there is no entitlement to attorney's fees. See Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. 
v. Ironwood Exploration. Inc.. 766 P.2d 1074, 1079-80 (Utah 1988); Travner v. 
Cushing. 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984). 
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See Travner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984): 
[A] party is entitled only to those fees attributable to the successful vindication of 
contractual rights within the terms of their agreement. 
Id. at 858. As it did in the Cottonwood Mall case, the Supreme Court reversed the 
attorney's fee award in Travner v. Cushing. 
MLL is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees for its claims of interference with 
contract, interference with prospective economic relations, or breach of covenant of good 
faith. The interference with contract claim was dismissed. MLL, under the Cottonwood 
Mall v. Sine and Travner v. Cushing standards, is not entitled to attorney's fees for a 
complaint which was dismissed for failure to state a claim. All time associated with 
preparing the complaint, responding to the Motion to Dismiss and preparing for and 
attending the hearing, must be disallowed. MLL has failed to allocate the fees claimed 
between these non-fee claims and its claim of breach of contract. 
The claim also included $25,000 for the cost of MLL's damage expert. That cost is 
not recoverable as attorneys' fees. Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686-87 (Utah App. 
1990). 
MLL's entire claim is defective and should be entirely disallowed for plaintiffs failure 
to designate the time and fees expended for claims for which there is no entitlement to 
attorney's fees. 
VIII. IF THE JUDGMENT IS REVERSED, MIDDLETONS MAY BE THE 
PREVAILING PARTY AND ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES; 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD DETERMINE THE ENTITLEMENT 
AND AMOUNT OF FEES. 
If the judgment is reversed, Middletons may be the prevailing party. Paragraph 16 
of the Amended Lease provides the defaulting party shall pay attorneys' fees. See text of 
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5 16 at Point VILA., supra. These Middletons qualify for attorney's fees under this provision 
as they gave MLL notice in their Answer and Counterclaim. R. at 411, 424. However, it 
also provides that if MLL files a suit against Middletons "in any way connected with this 
lease" the prevailing party shall be paid its attorney's fees. If the judgment is reveised, these 
Middletons may be prevailing parties. 
This Court should remand to the trial court to determine Middletons' eligibility for 
fees and the amount. 
CONCLUSION 
The bottom line is the judgment against these Middletons is not proper. The jury 
found in favor of these Middletons on all claims. MLL failed to provide notice to 
Middletons, as required by the Amended Lease. MLL knew that Anthony did not represent 
these Middletons. Ownership of the property by Middletons as tenants-in-common defeats 
MLL's claim against these Middletons, and MLL did not plead a joint liability theory. 
The judgment against these Middletons must be reversed with instructions to the trial 
court to dismiss MLL's claims with prejudice. 
DATED: February 8, 1993. 
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